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The following evidence addresses a selection of the questions posed in the call for evidence. It draws 
on a number of arguments and observations included in a range of the author’s existing analyses of 
EU enlargement.1 
 
1.  How has the UK influenced the enlargement process?  
The United Kingdom has been one of the most consistent advocates of EU enlargement and has used 
successive Council Presidencies to advance the process, notably in 2005 when it brokered the deal 
that allowed accession negotiations to be opened with Croatia and Turkey. Prior to this, Conservative 
and Labour governments in the 1990s and early 2000s were strong and vocal supporters of the 
principle at least of enlargement. While the rationales underpinning the support focused on the 
security and potential trade benefits and were in and of themselves well-argued and well-
intentioned, successive governments were never able to dispel entirely the widely-held assumption 
that a key motive behind the United Kingdom championing enlargement was to weaken integration 
tendencies in the EU; a larger, more diverse EU would be less likely to reach agreement on further 
integration. The scope for the United Kingdom leading in influencing the speed and direction of 
enlargement was consequently limited. 
The political desire to see the EU enlarge has not generally led to UK governments compromising on 
the formal criteria for accession. For the most part, successive UK governments have been focused 
on ensuring that criteria are met. Indeed, since eastern enlargement in 2004 and, especially, 2007, 
the United Kingdom has been one of the member states championing the development of more 
robust and effective conditionality and most insistent on criteria being fully and demonstrably met 
before progress towards and within accession negotiations is permitted. It has been among the 
steadfast member states in this respect with some candidates seemingly mystified by the contrast 
between UK rhetorical commitment to enlargement and its tough stance in negotiations. 
Much of this toughness in the UK stance has been based on a principled insistence that criteria are 
met before accession can take place, the prevailing view being that the credibility of enlargement as 
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a means of promoting political, economic and administrative reform needs to be enhanced if the 
acquis is to be upheld. This can be achieved by insisting that the accession criteria are demonstrably 
met before accession can take place. To date, successive governments have consistently upheld the 
view that enlargement is based on adoption of the full rights and obligations contained in acquis. 
There are indications, however, that the current government’s support is becoming less principled in 
that it wishes to see the free movement rights of citizens of future member states limited.  
3.  How do you consider the balance between the roles of member states and of the EU 
institutions in the process? Might UK interests be served by any changes to the balance of 
competences in this area?  
The Treaty on European Union (Article 49) sets out the essential procedural and decision-making 
roles of the EU’s member states and institutions in enlargement. Decisions on whether to admit an 
applicant require a unanimous decision of the member states in the Council. In addition, the treaty of 
accession requires ratification by each member state. Each member state therefore has a veto on 
enlargement (as does the European Parliament which must also give its consent to each 
enlargement). The Commission plays a central role in monitoring the progress of candidates in 
meeting the accession criteria and in proposing and implementing the EU’s enlargement strategy, 
including recommending the opening and closing of negotiating chapters. Decision-making, however, 
remains firmly with the member states in the Council. This has become increasingly evident as the 
unanimity requirement for the opening and closing of chapters has moved from being implicit in the 
case of the 2004 enlargement to being stated explicitly in the frameworks for negotiations agreed 
since 2004. It has also obviously been used by Cyprus and France to block negotiations with Turkey, 
and by Slovenia to delay progress in the negotiations with Croatia. The maintenance of the unanimity 
requirement is therefore a double-edged sword: available to ensure that the UK government can 
veto developments that run counter to its interests, but equally available to other member states to 
veto a process which, formally and publically, the UK government supports. 
4.  How effectively have the member states and the EU institutions run the enlargement 
process? Have lessons drawn from previous enlargement rounds been applied?  
The expansion of the acquis and the challenges associated with developing and implementing an 
accession process for the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they were still 
undergoing processes of political and economic reform led to a dramatic increase in resources 
dedicated to enlargement from the mid-1990s onwards and the development of a more pro-active 
engagement of the EU in assisting applicants initially and later ‘potential candidates’ in developing 
strategies and support mechanisms for meeting the accession criteria. While the development of 
annual monitoring and programmes such as Twinning were well intentioned, the experiences gained 
from the 2004 enlargement and especially the enlargement of 2007 revealed that the mechanisms in 
place to promote reforms in candidate and potential candidate countries required refinement if not 
reform if they were to promote the necessary political and administrative capacity to take on the 
obligations of membership. 
Consequently, significant changes have been introduced to the mechanics of accession in each case 
demonstrating that lessons have been drawn:  
 Conditionality has moved centre stage with criteria being extended and made more explicit 
with the thresholds for compliance being raised and monitoring intensified. Benchmarks for 
opening and closing negotiating chapters and ‘action plans’ have become the norm, with 
‘interim benchmarks’ also being introduced. No longer is the EU primarily interested in 
acceding states adopting and generally implementing the acquis at the time of accession: 
with candidates currently negotiating accession the emphasis is on establishing satisfactory 
track records in implementation and enforcement before a negotiating chapter can be 
closed.2 
 Administrative capacity to implement the acquis also enjoys much greater prominence, and 
there is an unprecedented emphasis on the need to uphold the rule of law through effective 
judicial capacity and the rooting out of corruption. This is reflected not least in the 
introduction of the ‘equilibrium clause’ making progress in all negotiating chapters 
contingent on progress in chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, 
freedom and security). Where progress is deemed to be ‘significantly’ lagging behind, 
negotiations in all chapters may be suspended, and by a qualified majority vote of the 
member states, not unanimity.3  
 In terms of the sequencing of negotiations, priority is now given to opening the more 
challenging and problematic chapters early so that issues can be addressed 
In addition, the political narrative surrounding enlargement has changed dramatically. Whereas 
‘eastern enlargement’ was presented very much as an historic opportunity to overcome the artificial 
Cold War division of Europe and to secure the ‘return to Europe’ of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, no similarly compelling narrative exists to justify further enlargement. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict of 1998-99, enlargement was presented as the key to 
promoting security and stability in the Western Balkans; only with the prospect of EU membership 
could peace and stability be re-established and flourish in the region. With relative stability in the 
Western Balkans any imperative to enlarge has receded, and the rhetoric has become somewhat 
muted. In the case of Turkey as well there is currently no compelling narrative justifying its 
admission; worse the rhetoric surrounding its accession bid is increasingly one that questions the 
desirability of admitting a formally secular state but a populous, large and culturally predominantly 
Muslim country bordering war-torn Syria and Iraq.  
To date the lessons drawn have been applied and the new mechanisms implemented. Accession has 
become a more technically refined and less politically-driven process, and consequently more 
demanding. Greater assistance and guidance exists to support candidates and potential candidates, 
but such guidance in terms of benchmarks and action plans can also be exploited to increase 
requirements. The scope to ‘move the goalposts’ is ever present. Moreover, the process is more 
explicitly ‘open-ended’ according to the frameworks for negotiation; accession is not a foregone 
conclusion of the opening of negotiations. The EU now also eschews the setting of any timetables for 
the opening or closing of negotiations or for accession itself, except once negotiations are effectively 
closed. In agreeing notional dates for accession in the case of Bulgaria and Romania the EU 
effectively tied its hands politically to a particular timetable for enlargement and so lost leverage in 
the reform processes in those countries and arguably admitted the countries prematurely.  
7.  What challenges / opportunities might EU enlargement face in future?  
Enlargement depends considerably on acceding states meeting an increasing array of demands to 
demonstrate their ability to assume the legal and political obligations of membership. The future of 
enlargement therefore depends on both continued demand and the ability of the applicants and 
potential candidates to maintain momentum in meeting the EU’s requirements for admission. 
Whereas demand is likely to continue to exist, at least among the less economically developed and 
politically stable European states,4 whether the reform momentum can be sustained in applicant and 
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potential candidate states in the light of the EU’s increasing demands and weakening commitment to 
enlarge is open to question. The EU has referred in recent years to its own ill-defined ‘enlargement 
fatigue’ and used this as a partial justification to ratchet up the requirements for membership; it has 
paid less attention to the ‘accession’ and ‘reform’ fatigue that threatens progress towards 
membership in some states. Contributing to the fatigue are the evident and understandable 
concerns about the credibility of the membership perspective that the EU has granted these states. 
Both the perspective and the timetable for its achievement are vague. 
On the perspective, it is striking that the European Council simply no longer deploys the language of 
Copenhagen that stated, subject to conditions being met: ‘associated countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members’ (emphasis added). Nor does the European 
Council, as it did at Luxembourg in 1997 for the Central and Eastern European applicants and at 
Helsinki for Turkey refer to the applicants and potential candidates as being ‘destined to join’ the EU. 
Instead the language is at best measured and at worst ambiguously non-committal. Referring to a 
state’s ‘European perspective’ and avoiding references to ‘membership’ and ‘accession’ simply does 
not convey a credible sense of commitment to their accession and the desire of the EU to see them 
admitted. Also, politicizing and delaying the granting of ‘candidate’ status – a legally meaningless 
status invented and conferred almost unhesitatingly on all applicants in 1999 – only undermines 
further the sense that the EU lacks the commitment it has previously had to enlargement. Failing to 
open negotiations with Macedonia despite repeated recommendations from the Commission and 
struggling to progress with the opening and closing of individual negotiating chapters, especially in 
the case of Turkey, does not enhance the credibility of the membership perspective. 
Overcoming its current comparatively weak commitment to further enlargement is a major challenge 
for the EU. A further challenge is the development of a compelling narrative or set of rationales 
justifying the process. While the EU consistently invokes arguments about creating stability through 
the promotion of prosperity and democratic reforms, these arguments do not resonate sufficiently 
among member states to generate a clear consensus on further enlargement to include all current 
candidates and potential candidates. A compelling narrative is needed to convince not only those 
member states unenthused by the prospect of further enlargement but also increasingly popular 
opinion.  
As far as member state governments are concerned, it is striking how reticent many are to make the 
case for further enlargement. The absence of any significant debate at European Council level since 
the ‘renewed consensus’ of 2006 is striking. This reflects not only barely hidden opposition among 
some member state governments to further enlargement (at least to include Turkey), but also the 
absence of a vocal set of champions of the process. The situation in 2014 offers a vivid contrast to 
twenty years ago as the EU moved from Copenhagen commitment of 1993 to the publication of 
Agenda 2000 in 1997. Voices can be heard today championing the cause of enlargement but they are 
neither loud nor powerful. 
The absence of clear and prominent voices making the case for enlargement and in doing so offering 
an attractive and convincing rationale for admitting more states means that declining levels of 
popular support for the process continue to go essentially unchecked. Equally if not more worrying 
for its supporters is the evident rise in opposition to further enlargement, again at least where the 
possible admission of Turkey is concerned. Such opposition is not limited to smaller, generally 
eurosceptic parties, but is also evident in some larger more mainstream parties. The permissive 
consensus on enlargement which existed in the 1990s has essentially gone; the speed and direction if 
not necessarily the process per se have become contested. And in this new era, there is a lack of 
concerted leadership on the issue. Member state governments often not only fail to make the case 
for further enlargement, they also openly question aspects of the process. A number have also either 
provided for or hinted at holding referenda on future accessions. Deferring to a popular vote can be 
justified on democratic grounds, but it also reflects reluctance on the part of some member states 
governments to challenge opponents and make the case for enlargement. In the absence of a 
concerted effort to communicate effectively the pros and cons of enlargement a rather skewed 
perception of the costs – often focusing on actual and potential migration flows, corruption and 
criminality – and to a lesser extent the benefits has emerged. Again, governments have generally 
done little to counter such perceptions and in some cases have shown a preference for exploiting for 
domestic political gain populist arguments about cultural and religious difference and claims of 
excessive migration and ‘benefit tourism’. 
A further development of concern is the increasing willingness of member states to wield their 
vetoes in the enlargement process. There have been occasions where the refusal to support the 
progress of a state further towards membership has been principled and based on a broadly 
justifiable set of conditionality-related arguments which have subsequently been met. On other 
occasions, the veto has often been cast for narrow and often selfish national political reasons 
resulting in either a failure to open negotiations (Macedonia) or a temporary (Croatia) or longer-term 
(Turkey) deadlock in negotiations. There is an evident unwillingness among some member states to 
overcome deadlocks, to act on commitments made to the candidate, and to countenance a softening 
or withdrawal of their veto. Insufficient energies have been expended in recent years on overcoming 
such vetoes which threaten ultimately to derail the process. 
This lack of energy is arguably symptomatic of the enlargement fatigue – possibly even enlargement 
ennui – that has characterised EU engagement for much of the last decade. It is striking, as noted, 
that the European Council has barely discussed enlargement during this period except to endorse the 
annual Council conclusions on the process. Pre-occupation with the Eurozone crisis provides an 
important explanation, but this has not prevented other issues from being on the agenda for 
meetings. The absence of detailed discussion at the European Council level reflects the fact that 
enlargement has moved from being a political priority of and imperative for the EU.  
8.  How might the EU’s approach to enlargement be improved in future?  
Compared to the mid-1990s when it was contemplating the opening of negotiations with applicant 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the EU currently has a far more developed approach to 
enlargement. Conditionality, in itself a more refined and increasingly detailed process, is rightly at its 
core. Consequently the accession of candidates has become even more focused on technical issues. 
And the focus is very much on the candidates individually, so effectively ruling out the possibility of a 
substantial regional ‘south-eastern’ enlargement to follow the ‘big bang’ ‘eastern’ enlargement of 
2004.  
Enlargement nevertheless remains a political process. While much attention has been given to what 
requirements need to be and are made of applicants before they may join and how compliance 
should be determined, ensuring that enlargement is invested with sufficient political capital to secure 
its success has attracted far less attention as the slow progress of Macedonia and Turkey towards 
accession attest. 
Following earlier comments, a range of issues should be addressed. 
- A compelling narrative for enlargement needs to be developed and deployed to support the 
process. 
- More effective communication of the rationales behind and the costs and benefits from 
enlargement is needed if public opinion is to at least accept if not actively support further 
enlargement. 
- The credibility of the membership perspective in the eyes of actual and potential applicants 
and candidates needs to be enhanced if reform fatigue is to be countered.  
 
 
